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ROLE OF THE DIASPORAS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
LESSONS FROM ARMENIA
Lev M. Freinkman1
In the second half of the 20th century several world
economies have benefited considerably by capitaliz-
ing on their links with national Diasporas. China and
Israel seem to be the best-known examples of coun-
tries that received a major developmental push from
their nationals located throughout the world. While
in most countries the main Diaspora-related benefit
for the domestic economy was and still is associated
with private transfers (including remittances), sent by
members of Diasporas to their relatives and friends at
home, China and Israel managed to complement this
traditional financial support by much more active in-
volvement of the Diaspora in their economic devel-
opment. In these countries, Diaspora investors and
entrepreneurs played a critical role in attracting FDI,
setting up joint ventures, promoting export of do-
mestic companies, etc. In short, these examples con-
firm that traditional ethnical and cultural links could
be instrumental in facilitating integration into the in-
ternational economy as well as transferring of new
professional and managerial skills.
Efficient utilization of the Diaspora’s potential is
rather relevant for economies in transition. This is
because, on the supply side, many countries of East-
ern and Central Europe do have large (relative to the
size of their population), well-organized, highly edu-
cated and broadly successful Diasporas. Armenia,
Lithuania, and Serbia may be mentioned as the most
obvious examples. But, this is also relevant for Po-
land, other Baltic countries and former Yugoslavian
republics. One may also expect that the Cuban Di-
aspora (Cuban exiles) have the potential to play a
prominent role in the future market transition in Cu-
ba.
Even more importantly, on the demand side, as the
experience of the first decade of transition has shown,
most economies in transition face a significant short-
age of skills and resources, over which many Diaspo-
ran communities have much better control and/or
access. This relates to many core components of fi-
nancial, human, and social capital, which, if well mo-
bilized, could accelerate the entire dynamics of the
transition process.
This paper develops additional economic arguments
to emphasize the potential importance of the Diaspo-
ras’ contribution to economic transformation of
former socialist economies. At the same time, it ar-
gues that so far this potential has been grossly un-
derutilized, especially in the economies of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU). Based on the analysis of such
underutilization, the paper provides a set of simple
recommendations on how to rationalize the Diaspo-
ra’s involvement and assistance to home countries in
the course of transition.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section
suggests a general framework to analyze the Diaspo-
ra’s role in economic transition. The second section
1. The views in the paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank. I am grateful to Yevgeny Kuznetsov
and Jonathan Walters for discussions of many ideas reflected in this paper and important suggestions.Role of the Diasporas in Transition Economies
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provides an in-depth review of the Armenian experi-
ence with mobilizing the Diaspora’s assistance in the
1990s. It argues that from the transition perspective,
support provided by the Armenian Diaspora to inde-
pendent Armenia since 1991 has been rather ineffi-
cient. The third section summarizes differences be-
tween Armenian and Israeli settings and argues that
these could explain a considerable part of observed
differences in the efficiency of the Diasporas’ mobili-
zation. The final section presents a set of recommen-
dations that intend to balance political and humani-
tarian objectives of Diasporas with their contribution
to economic development of home countries. These
recommendations may be used for developing a strat-
egy to be played by the Cuban exile community in
the future Cuban transition.
ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE DIASPORA FOR 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES: GENERAL 
FRAMEWORK
Albert Hirschman (1958) once noted that develop-
ment is not so much about allocation of existing re-
sources but rather about mobilizing resources that are
hidden, scattered or badly utilized. The traditional
practice of the relationship between Diasporas and
their countries of origin strongly supports this idea.
Financial contributions of many Diasporas around
the world to respective domestic economies is well
documented and very significant. Several South
Asian nations received more than US$2 billion in re-
mittances a year (Castles, 1999). According to the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in six
Latin American countries, annual remittances ex-
ceeded 10% of GDP (Inter-American Development
Bank, 2001).
As a rule, financial transfers of expatriates to their
families in home countries constitute a major part of
these financial flows. In several cases, private transfers
are complemented by financial flows initiated by Di-
aspora NGOs to support various public and quasi-
public initiatives at home. What is common for these
flows, however, is that they are used almost exclusive-
ly for subsistence, consumption, and philanthropic
purposes rather than for productive investments and
development in a broad sense. Overall, the develop-
ment impact of Diasporas as well as of returned mi-
gration, while not well documented, varies consider-
ably between countries. For instance, Turkey is a
known example of a state where mass emigration to
Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s produced
little development benefit (Castles, 1999). From this
perspective, what makes the experience of both Israel
and China so successful is the fact that they managed
to divert a considerable chunk of expatriates’ resourc-
es into a source of investment finance, export expan-
sion, and new technology.2
Lessons of Transition
Experience accumulated during ten years of transi-
tion in Eastern Europe brought some gradual adjust-
ment to the initial transition paradigm. Among the
lessons from the practical transition experience, I
would like to underline just two:3
• Economic growth has been coming mostly from
newly-created companies (both domestic and
foreign), not from privatized, inherited state en-
terprises;
• Speed of change in management culture and
business practices is a critical factor of growth.
When compared to the original understanding of
challenges in transition, the current thinking seems
to pay much less attention than in the early 1990s to
the speed of privatization and tightness of monetary
policy. While these are indeed important pre-requi-
sites of successful transition, it is understood now
that it is other factors that make a real difference in
the medium term between countries’ transition
paths. Those are the factors related to the quality of
investment climate, proximity to established mar-
kets, speed of transfer of new managerial skills, sim-
plicity of access to existing access, including land, etc.
From this perspective, economies in transition (and
developing countries in general) that have large and
2. Rauch (1999) reviews the role of the Chinese Diaspora in facilitating international trade with mainland China. 
3. Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999); Djankov and Murrell (2000).Cuba in Transition · ASCE 2001
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economically influential Diasporas may have strong
comparative advantages. In short, the Diaspora could
accelerate closing the gap that inevitably exists be-
tween the post-socialist economy and the rest of the
world as well as provide a strong backing for integra-
tion of the home country into the global market.
While expansion of new companies in transition
economies is often constrained by lack of market
knowledge and the high costs of entering new mar-
kets, Diasporas accumulate considerable business,
networking and marketing skills.4 In most cases there
are also business and professional Diaspora associa-
tions that could be instrumental in developing and
implementing specific project initiatives.
At least potentially, the home countries could use
their cultural links with the Diasporas to:
• extract additional support in forms of FDI and
management training to facilitate the creation
and expansion of new companies;
• accelerate building new business partnerships be-
tween local and international companies to ad-
vance transfer of skills and technologies;
• provide advice to governments of home coun-
tries with respect to improvement of investment
climate and deregulation.
Especially attractive is the idea of Diasporan investors
being the “first movers,” i.e., investors who could
come first to an emerging market of the home coun-
try, and by doing this could change market expecta-
tions and advance an inflow of more conventional
FDI. The concept of “first movers” is important to
understand the dynamics of early transition, in a situ-
ation that is characterized by great uncertainty and
excessive economic risks. First movers or market
leaders are critical to get the economy moving in
such an unattractive situation. They provide behav-
ioral models for the rest of the economic agents.
They consolidate reform coalitions that push the
Government to undertake further reforms, including
those related to fare competition and reduced admin-
istrative barriers.
When compared to the average economic agent, Di-
aspora businessmen and professionals face a lower
risk of becoming the first movers. They benefit from
a specific informational advantage: common cultural
background and established social links between Di-
aspora and local entrepreneurs help them to reduce
transaction costs of new entry and building new part-
nerships. And by being the first movers, Diaspora
representatives have a chance of becoming leaders,
mentors, partners and godfathers of the local private
sector.
Still, there is not much positive experience world-
wide. Diaspora networks as a source of development
expertise and business linkages are underutilized and
existing activity is fragmented and idiosyncratic.
Development Scenario: Difficult and 
Controversial Transition Path
For the purposes of this paper, we are concentrated
on the transition scenario, which is characterized by
reform complications, uneven speed of transforma-
tion in different sectors, strong anti-reform opposi-
tion, and significant economic losses at the initial
stages of reforms. This is not an unavoidable scenar-
io, but it is not uncommon either. It happened in
most of the countries of the former Soviet Union
(FSU) as well as in places, to mention a few, such as
Romania and Albania.
There is an obvious reason why I am not interested
in reviewing a more successful transition path: if
transition goes smoothly, there is not much for the
Diaspora to contribute to. Private markets and the
local public sector would be generally capable of ad-
dressing primary challenges of transition. In cases
like Poland and Slovenia, which in the first years of
transition featured an explosion of local entrepre-
neurship, supported at a later stage by significant in-
flows of traditional FDI, the Diaspora’s contribution
could be only marginal.
4. Gould (1994) for instance presents statistical evidence of significant links between incidence of immigration to the United States
and intensity of export from the country, which is a country of origin for these immigrants, to the United States.Role of the Diasporas in Transition Economies
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This paper deals with a much less favorable transition
setting. Its main characteristic rests on the fact that
old communist elites are replaced only partially, and
the new political establishment contains a good
chunk of communist bureaucrats, security service of-
ficers, and managers of large state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). This first generation of post-communist elite
in this scenario is much less democratic and liberal
than the leaders of the Czech velvet revolution. This
elite does push aggressively for economic liberaliza-
tion and privatization, but does it in a way that al-
lows the elite (especially enterprise managers) to
“privatize” major benefits of reforms. This type of
political leader is broadly suspicious about the Di-
aspora. While they welcome economic and political
support from the Diaspora, they do not want to see
an increased representation of Diasporan activists
and investors in the home country. They see and
treat the Diaspora primarily as a source of potential
political and economic competition.
At the same time, quick liberalization and elimina-
tion of traditional socialist subsidies brings a major
shock to the domestic economy. Many traditional in-
dustries collapse, and average household incomes
plummet. Pre-transitional savings evaporate. It all
leads to a fiscal crisis. The regime goes bankrupt,
while the elite flourish and the economy features a
major concentration of economic wealth. The coun-
try is facing a challenge of reindustrialization and
finding its new place at global markets, but it doesn’t
have the necessarily skills and resources to deal with
these challenges. The international community ini-
tiates an assistance program to address humanitarian
concerns and helps to deal with at least some of the
development challenges.
What should we expect from the Diaspora in this
kind of setting?
ARMENIA: EXPERIENCE OF THE 1990s
Pre-transition Characteristics
One may argue that Armenia had quite a beneficial
starting position for transition. Back in the early
1990s, it demonstrated many similarities with Israel
of the 1950s. The territorial conflict in Karabakh has
mobilized Armenians worldwide, greatly strength-
ened ethnical identity, and advanced national consol-
idation. At the same time, one may think, based on
the Israeli experience, that future Armenian transi-
tion to the market would be rather successful.
Soviet Armenia was the most educated and most in-
dustrialized republic of the FSU. It was considered a
Silicon Valley of the Soviet Union, with a major con-
centration of high tech industries. Its expected suc-
cessful transition would be also backed by quite a de-
veloped infrastructure and the traditionally strong
labor morale of Armenians.
And of course, Armenia expected to be supported by
the Diaspora. For such a small country (about 3.5
million inhabitants in 1990), the Diaspora presented
an extraordinary source of development resources. It
is believed that more than one million Armenians
live in the United States, and at least another million
in Europe, Middle East, and Latin America. This is a
very successful national group, both economically
and professionally. It is also well organized politically
and socially, with an established track record of suc-
cessful political and humanitarian mobilization. In
addition, Armenians could rely on the good will of
its traditional partner Russia—Russian Armenians
(more than 1.5 million) have been traditionally quite
influential in the Kremlin.
While Armenia also had serious economic disadvan-
tages, such as landlocked location, the impact of the
1988 Earthquake, and loss of traditional markets af-
ter disintegration of the FSU, on balance the country
seemed to have a great development potential and a
major chance of becoming a transition success story.
After 10 Years of Transition
The outcome of 10 years of Armenian transition has
been quite disappointing. While the Armenian econ-
omy has been growing since 1994, its GDP in 2000
amounted to just two-thirds of the pre-transitional
level. And the prevailing growth patterns are consid-
ered to be unsustainable: the economy shows too lit-
tle of new private entry and job creation, low invest-
ments, and weak export capacity.
Armenia currently belongs to a group of the poorest
nations in the World, its nominal annual GDP per
capita amounts to about $US650; 55% of the popu-Cuba in Transition · ASCE 2001
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lation lives in poverty; and about 30% of the labor
force is unemployed (World Bank, 2001).
It is also estimated that about 20% of the Armenian
population has emigrated during these 10 years, with
most of them moving to Russia (Poghossian, 2000).
While there is no systematic analysis of this popula-
tion outflow, piecemeal evidence suggests that at
least 30% of all migrants have college degrees. This
clearly constitutes a major brain drain, which de-
prives the country of its major long-term develop-
ment resource. At the same time, in the short term
this new emigration provides considerable income
support for the Armenian population. It is estimated
that recent emigrants contribute up to 65% of total
private transfers received by Armenia.
Weak export performance should be considered as a
surprising outcome. Even though Armenia has one of
the most liberalized trade regimes in the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), its merchandise
exports amounted in 2000 to 16% of GDP, among
the lowest in the FSU. For a small country heavily
dependent on import of raw materials and with an
economy that historically was closely integrated with
its neighbors, the existing level of exports is abysmal-
ly low and creates a major macroeconomic risk.
While traditional markets in the FSU collapsed, Ar-
menian enterprises have faced serious difficulties
with penetrating new markets. Given the standard
perception of Armenians as established international
traders, this indicates that transferring of trading and
marketing skills from the Diaspora to Armenians in
Armenia has not been successful yet.
The inflow of Diasporan investments has been also
much below expectations. In total during 1995-99,
Armenia received on average less than $30 of FDI
per capita,5 while Slovenia and Lithuania attracted
more than $100 per capita, and Estonia, Hungary
and the Czech Republic more than $200. And a sur-
prisingly large part of Diasporan investments came
from Russia rather than from the West, where Arme-
nian communities have more business experience and
a larger overall investment potential.
What Went Wrong?
In Armenia, the first post-communist regime evolved
under strong influence of the military establishment,
which is not surprising given that the country was in-
volved in open military conflict. Also, from the very
beginning, the military leadership established its own
substantial business interests, arguing that these busi-
ness ventures help to finance the war effort. The
Karabakh war also caused an extreme mobilization
and significant authoritarian features in the organiza-
tion of the Armenian society. This over-mobilization
of the early 1990s had a serious impact on the subse-
quent political developments (Bremmer, 1996), and
it has been detrimental to the reform process through
the following channels:
• In public administration, it supported establish-
ment of an excessive control and inspection
structure, and more generally delayed deregula-
tion of the business environment.
• In policy making, it limited opportunities for
public participation in discussions over reform
priorities; lack of dialogue between main stock-
holders made it much more difficult for the
Government to maintain public support for re-
forms and created additional problems with im-
plementation.
• In the economic area, close links between exist-
ing leading firms (both recently privatized SOEs
and start-ups) and power ministries and influen-
tial politicians became a major source of non-
competitive behavior and barriers for entry.
There has been little room for small and medium
businesses to operate independently from politi-
cal clans.
• At the same time, the Armenian Government
managed to establish a nice liberal façade, stop
inflation, and advance various market-oriented
reforms (such as privatization, liberalization, and
introduction of market-friendly legislation).
5. In fact, even these numbers are inflated because one third of all foreign investments came through two major privatization deals in
infrastructure.Role of the Diasporas in Transition Economies
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From the macroeconomic perspective, after
1996, the Armenian macroeconomic environ-
ment has contained few distortions associated
with for instance Government regulations, nom-
inal tax regime, and budget subsidies. Conven-
tional indexes of reform progress suggest that by
2000, Armenia has become a leading reformer in
the CIS.
However, at the microeconomic level no real liberal-
ization happened. Traditional centralized socialist
regulations were largely replaced by various decen-
tralized regulations and controls, imposed by sectoral
ministries, local authorities, and influential business
groups that did not want competition. The state has
no capability (and little incentive) to enforce the fa-
vorable macroeconomic and legal framework and
support formation of a decent business environment.
While the economy remains in the hands of semi-in-
dependent business elite with close tiers to key politi-
cal figures (Suny, 1999, p. 2), the emerged invest-
ment climate has been rather hostile to any
independent new entry, including to investors from
the Diaspora.6 Thus, “despite their outspoken sup-
port for investments, the Armenian Government has
been mostly interested in receiving humanitarian aid
and long-term unrestricted loans – sources of fund-
ing they can control much more easily than direct in-
vestments” (Bremmer, 1996, p. 32). And because
state officials benefit so much from imports, which
remains the most lucrative business, many have a rea-
son to oppose an influx of investments that could
substitute imports by domestic production.7
In addition, soon after the cease-fire was reached in
1994, the national consolidation of Armenian society
started to evaporate. The political elite, which led the
country’s independence movement and its war effort,
was affected by serious internal conflicts and fights
for leadership. Fragmentation of the political elite
had its manifestation in the high turnover of Arme-
nian Governments. Since 1991, Armenia had 10
Prime Ministers.8 While these personnel changes in
most cases produced very little change in economic
policy, they contributed considerably to investors’
perception of economic uncertainty and instability.
The Armenian Diaspora reacted to this situation by:
• Providing a major inflow of humanitarian aid
and private transfers;
• Successfully lobbying the U.S. Government for
expanding official assistance to Armenia;
• Providing strong and basically unconditional po-
litical support to the changing Armenian Gov-
ernments.
In all these areas the Diaspora was largely successful.
Armenia became a leading global recipient of inter-
national assistance. In 2000, it received about
US$240 million (11% of GDP) in total official assis-
tance through a combination of official transfers and
concessional loans, or about US$75 per capita. In ad-
dition, Armenia benefits from considerable amounts
of humanitarian and technical assistance that is not
reflected in the budget. In the United States, the Di-
aspora lobby succeeded in extracting from the Con-
gress a disproportionally large amount of U.S. assis-
tance to Armenia, which has amounted to $90
million a year, and at the same time blocked similar
assistance programs for Azerbaijan.
Armenia continues to benefit from the considerable
inflow of remittances and private transfers (currently
at 8-9% of GDP a year), which are mostly coming
from relatives who either recently emigrated or who
are temporarily working abroad. According to house-
hold surveys, not less than 15% of families were re-
cipients of regular private transfers. And for about
8% of households such transfers represented a major
element of income support in 1999.
6. FIAS Report (2000) provides a systematic description of the problems with the Armenian investment climate.
7. It is also relevant to note the consistency with which the concept of double citizenship has been rejected by the Armenian political
elite over the last 10 years. This is another indication of local concerns about potential political competition with Diaspora leaders.
8. Collier (2000) suggests a correlation between success of reforms and government’s tenure in power.Cuba in Transition · ASCE 2001
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At the same time, Diaspora representatives remained
disengaged from active day-to-day participation in
economic and political life in Armenia. The Diaspo-
ra’s attempts to invest mostly failed due to the hostile
attitude of insiders. But major Diasporan organiza-
tions have never tried in a systematic way to protect
their members from business abuse in Armenia. As a
strategy, the Diaspora tends to limit its public criti-
cism out of concern for the government’s reputation.
There is also no intention to do a serious evaluation
of results achieved through the massive international
assistance of the previous 10 years. The act of giving
seems to be more important than the actual effect.
Thus, while the regime in Yerevan has been heavily
dependent on the Diaspora’s support, the Diaspora
did not use this dependence for “buying” for itself a
more active role in Armenia’s development process.
Just the opposite, the Diaspora accepted the uncon-
ditional character of its support. In real life it meant
that the Diaspora provided a considerable chunk of
financing and political backing to the regime that did
not want to see a growth in economic/political influ-
ence of the Diaspora, and actually has been blocking
the Diaspora’s attempts to expand productive invest-
ments.9
This kind of Diaspora response, in my view, repre-
sents a major underutilization of the Diaspora’s po-
tential. It does not contribute adequately to strength-
ening the Armenian private sector and the country’s
growth prospects. Even in the cases (still limited)
when the Diaspora is involved in business projects, it
operates mostly a source of financing and much less
as a source of market information and expertise, not
a knowledge bridge. This is because the Armenia-Di-
aspora dialogue is still focused primarily on fostering
cultural and humanitarian links.
As it was established in Soviet times, rules for Arme-
nia-Diaspora interactions are still defined in Yerevan.
With respect to prospects for Diaspora’s investors in
Armenia, the remark by Amirkhanian (1997) seems
to be rather indicative. In his very interesting account
of the complexity of the relationship between the Ar-
menian Government and the Diaspora, he under-
lines a demand side of the investment process: “The
significance of the Diaspora will come down to
whether the local Armenians can afford to share their
limited resources and opportunities with the outsid-
ers” (p. 21). So far, there is little evidence that the
political elite in Yerevan is ready for such a sharing.
However, as this paper argues, it may stay this way
for a long time, if its Diasporan partners remain pas-
sive and agreeable to the formula “Give us your mon-
ey and go home.”
Meanwhile, there are reasons to believe that the Di-
aspora’s involvement in Armenia in its current form
has gradually become part of the Armenian develop-
ment problem, not a source of solutions for its transi-
tional challenges. The Diaspora’s money and politi-
cal support help to take the pressure out of the
system and therefore they undermine demand for
further domestic reforms, especially for improve-
ments in the business environment. The ruling elite
gets additional resources for survival that provide a
breathing space for delaying necessary reforms de-
spite extreme poverty and emigration of the most
skilled.
WHY IS IT SO DIFFICULT FOR ARMENIANS 
TO USE THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE?
Despite many similarities between recent Armenian
history and that of Israel after its independence, there
are also striking differences that could at least partial-
ly explain such a contrast in the efficiency of the Di-
asporas’ mobilization.
First, most Diaspora Armenians have no historical
connection with Armenia as currently constituted.
They are Western Armenians from the region that is
currently a part of Turkey. For most of them, Arme-
nia is more of an idea than a real country that may be
considered as a place of potential residency and busi-
ness activity. Second, 70 years of socialism in Arme-
9. While the Armenian situation may seem extraordinary, it is unlikely to be unique. For instance, even in Lithuania, which clearly has
a better investment climate, there is no noticeable inflow of the Diaspora’s investments, while the Diaspora is providing considerable
humanitarian and political support.Role of the Diasporas in Transition Economies
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nia created a cultural divide with its non-FSU Di-
aspora that has no parallel for Israel.10 This divide is
largely responsible for the fact that the Diaspora has
very limited cultural affinity with Armenia.11 Third,
and the most obvious difference, is that in contrast to
Israel, the Armenian Diaspora does not have an ideo-
logical foundation for supporting Armenia as there is
with Zionism. It is sometimes suggested (Golden-
berg, 1994, p. 146-47) that this explains why the Di-
aspora’s support for Armenia is less institutionalized
and is less “strategic” but more individualistic and
project-specific.
It is also important to remember that in contrast to
other Diasporas (e.g., Ukrainian and from the Baltic
states), creation of an independent Armenian state
was never part of the traditional agenda12 of the
mainstream Diaspora in Soviet times. The opposite
view was the most popular: “that Armenia could not
become an independent state in face of dangers of
pan-Turkism” (Suny, 1999, p. 3). As a result, the Ar-
menian Diaspora was ideologically quite unprepared
to deal with an independent Armenia. And, as it
seems, after 10 years of independence it is fair to say
that it failed to switch (or at least to expand) from its
traditional  “cultural and nationalistic” agenda to a
new agenda of supporting the formation of a new in-
dependent national state.
While all the issues related to the Genocide and resti-
tution are of major historical and humanitarian sig-
nificance, it is still an agenda of the past, while the
nation, engaged in building its statehood from
scratch, is in dire need of a positive agenda related to
its future. This difference in perspective suggests that
interests of the Diaspora are often different and
sometimes in contradiction to those of the Armenian
state (Dadwick, 1993, pp. 278-80; Amirkhanian,
1997, p. 21). For instance, the Diaspora in the Unit-
ed States has never tried to use its political leverage to
push Turkey for opening the border with Armenia:
while this is a major development issue for the Arme-
nian state, it has never been high on the Diaspora’s
list. Moreover, a very tough position of the Diaspora
on the Genocide (while emotionally understandable)
made inter-governmental relations between Armenia
and Turkey even more difficult and dramatically re-
duced chances for opening the Turkish boarder for
Armenian goods and services.
In addition, internal political divisions in the Arme-
nian Diaspora seem to be a surprisingly important
constraint for developing a consolidated Diaspora
strategy for supporting a new Armenian development
agenda. These political divisions are to a major extent
based on tradition and much less on real differences
in current policies. The dividing line for most Di-
aspora Armenians is still a policy towards Turkey
(Goldenberg, p. 150-51).
LESSONS FROM ARMENIA AND HOW THEY 
COULD BE APPLIED TO A FUTURE CUBAN 
TRANSITION
At the initial stage of transition it may be difficult for
people outside of the country to make an accurate as-
sessment of the depth and direction of ongoing trans-
formation. People could be biased in their desire to
see more changes than actually take place. It is under-
standable: in the case of Cuba many exiles have been
waiting for 40 years for a window of opportunity.
Thus, there is a risk that the Diaspora may overesti-
mate the actual reform effort, and over-commit its
support to the first post-communist Government.
This paper argues that it is important to be cautious
in making an initial assessment. The scale of human-
itarian needs in the home country as well as the beau-
ty of political statements made by Government offi-
10. Jonathan Walters suggests that in fact one could compare the Armenian Diaspora with the Jewish Diaspora in Arab countries be-
fore the mid-1950s. At that time, the Sephardim had little interest in Israel, which they considered as a European/Ashkenazi state that
had little to do with their cultural or historical experience.
11. According to Goldenberg (1994, p. 135), the politics of the Cold War further reduced the significance of the Soviet Armenia as a
real or at least potential symbol of national identity. 
12. Ronald Suny (1999, p. 13) suggests the following main features of traditional “Armenian cause”: pursuing the recognition of
Genocide, a tougher stand toward Turkey and on the Karabakh issue, and developing closer links with and within the Diaspora.Cuba in Transition · ASCE 2001
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cials, are insufficient to reach a reliable conclusion.
The litmus test of post-communist liberalization re-
lates to economic liberalization and introduction of a
level-playing field for established and de novo busi-
nesses.
The principal lesson from the Armenian experience is
that a massive program of humanitarian assistance,
not complemented by an active business support and
investment program, is not sustainable. It eventually
fuels emigration and concentration of economic
power. It does not help (but just delays) resolution of
the most important challenges of transition. If the
D i a s p o r a  c o m m u n i ty  i s  n o t  a l l o w e d  t o  d o  s e r i o u s
business in the home country, it does not make sense
to support the respective government politically and
economically. If the Diaspora is wealthy and power-
ful so that it is capable of mobilizing considerable re-
sources in support of the home country, it should
make sure that a good portion of the resources is
channeled for needs of business development and the
private sector.
Providing massive humanitarian assistance suggests
that the Diaspora community takes serious responsi-
bility for the current state of the home country. The
same responsibility requires playing a more active
role in its economic development. In other words,
humanitarian assistance without investments proved
to be an irresponsible strategy.
What would be the main features of the alternative
strategy for the Diaspora in the scenario of “non-en-
tirely democratic and liberal” transition? Those may
include:
• Do not be shy to criticize the regime: no uncon-
ditional political and financial support;
• Demand that political liberalization should be
followed by policies that promote economic lib-
eralization at the micro level;
• Disseminate the idea that the creation of new
businesses and new jobs is a critical dimension of
social progress in transition; these are ultimate
indicators that democratic/liberal reforms have
been done right;
• Do not overkill the country with soft money:
without investments, humanitarian aid will solve
no problem;
• Support organizations of new local private busi-
nesses that are not linked to the political struc-
ture of the ruling elite: these organizations will
become a main engine of further domestic re-
forms;
• Support practical business and managerial train-
ing of new business owners and managers in new
companies: they will be main business and polit-
ical partners of the Diaspora.
It may happen that the initial conditions of transi-
tion would be too tough for Diaspora representatives
to make any rational individual investments. If this is
the case, the Diaspora leaders may think about col-
lective investment instruments to share risks, such as
a seed equity fund and a Diaspora development
bank. Such institutions may be rather useful to sup-
port new entry, first movers. They are also important
instruments for outsiders to have first-hand knowl-
edge of business realities and monitor patterns of
economic liberalization. Finally, collective invest-
ment instruments could trigger a transformation of
the inflow of humanitarian assistance into real sector
investments.
Another lesson to be drawn from the Armenian expe-
rience relates to the utilization of international assis-
tance, first that of assistance provided by the U.S.
Government. While the Armenian Diaspora man-
aged to generate record amounts of U.S. assistance
for Armenia, they were participating neither in de-
signing specific assistance projects nor in general
monitoring of how the money is spent. I would argue
that the Diasporan organizations and Diaspora activ-
ists have to insist on playing a very active role in im-
plementation of U.S. Government-funded projects.
This may be done at the level of professional organi-
zations of the Diaspora that would become contrac-
tors of the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment and other similar agencies, or at individual
levels, when people could go to the home country to
become advisers in local NGOs, Government agen-
cies, and restructuring firms.Role of the Diasporas in Transition Economies
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Also, the Armenia experience and that of other FSU
states suggests that some forms of technical assistance
are much more productive than others, that unfortu-
nately are still popular. In line with other parts of this
paper, I would argue in favor of very practical, busi-
ness-oriented interventions, such as:
• Short-term internship for new business owners
in foreign firms—instead of traditional under-
graduate training in the United States;
• Direct support to new organizations of the pri-
vate sector—instead of financing the import of
numerous new tiny NGOs engaged in environ-
ment protection and human rights activism;
• Public work programs (e.g., infrastructure
rehabilitation)—instead of free food;
• Careful selection of technical assistance recipi-
ents in the public sector: avoid pushing for cre-
ation of too many and too advanced institutions
(e.g., Securities Market Regulator), be more
practical (e.g., building an independent Statisti-
cal Service usually is an immediate priority).
Another important element of the Armenian experi-
ence relates to finding a proper balance between im-
portant issues of the past and those of the future. The
Armenian Diaspora and its intellectual leaders, it
seems, were and still are too preoccupied with unre-
solved historical issues, while less attention is given to
looking at the development agenda that confronts
the modern Armenian state.
Cubans are likely to be exposed to a similar major
risk of “demons of the past.” This is because the Di-
aspora’s claims in the future for restitution of assets
nationalized after the revolution. Restitution is both
economically and emotionally important, but its res-
olution can not be found over night. It will take
time, during which the debates over restitution
should not block Cuba’s economic life and the over-
all transition process.
Finally, being an accidental observer of some (maybe
not representative) discussions about future problems
of the Cuban transition, I got the impression that a
considerable part of questions raised are based on the
assumption that Cuba would go through a perfectly
smooth transition. There is always a possibility that
this could be the case. Then indeed many of the fol-
lowing questions would become of immediate im-
portance: How many Cuban exiles will decide to re-
turn to Cuba?13 Would this return be disruptive to
the Cuban labor market? Should the inflow of for-
eign capital to Cuba be regulated in the early transi-
tion to prevent excessive purchases of domestic assets
by foreigners at depressed prices?14
One of the objectives of this paper was to show that
the Cuban-American community should be aware of
a different transition path, which would make anoth-
er set of questions more practical: What could be
done to ease emigration pressures in early transition,
especially among the young and the most skilled?
How to encourage an inflow of foreign capital, tech-
nology and skills in the hostile business environ-
ment? How to transform the flow of humanitarian
assistance and remittances into productive invest-
ments? How to promote business cooperation be-
tween local and Diasporan businesses? And how un-
der these unfortunate circumstances to make the
overall strategy of the Diaspora community balanced
and rational?
13. Based on the experience of emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States, both intensity and direction of migration flows de-
pend primarily on the income differentials between two countries. Thus, one should expect a significant inflow of Cuban emigrants in
the early transition, not another way around. 
14. See Pérez-López (2001) for the discussion of some of these issues.Cuba in Transition · ASCE 2001
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